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Abstract
We study duopoly pricing in the market for mobile phone service, which features
network externalities, switching costs, and consumer heterogeneity. We introduce a
steady state approach that enables a tractable analysis without endgame effects. The
model can generate a variety of testable predictions, of which we focus on the compar-
ative statics with respect to switching costs. Using data on the mobile phone service
industries in 52 countries, we use the variation in market structure at the time switching
costs were suddenly reduced by the regulatory imposition of mobile number portability
(MNP). Firms that grew more rapidly prior to MNP respond to MNP by pricing more
aggressively; firms facing large competitors respond less aggressively. Exploration of
the model and its implications is an object of ongoing research.
Keywords: Oligopoly, network externalities, switching costs, mobile number porta-
bility. JEL Classifications: L13.
∗The authors thank the NET Institute, www.NETinst.org, for financial support. This study is preliminary
and incomplete.
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1 Introduction
Markets for mobile phone service are interesting not only for their economic and techno-
logical importance, but also because they exhibit network externalities and switching costs.
One particular switching cost—the cost of changing one’s phone number when one switches
service providers—has been eliminated in many countries by the regulatory imposition of
mobile number portability (MNP). The fact that MNP was introduced in different countries
at different times, and to different market structures, provides a kind of natural experiment
that can help inform our understanding of network externalities and switching costs. There
is evidence that introducing MNP decreases market concentration; surprisingly, however, it
actually increases the disparity in profitability between the leader and other firms, although
the effect is mitigated in markets that are growing particularly quickly (Wei and Zhu, 2010).
Our study is inspired by such a conundrum, and seeks to further explore its underly-
ing mechanisms. Our preliminary empirical results show that when MNP is introduced,
although prices trend downward, the leader firm tends to reduce its prices less than other
firms. Whereas the finding is consistent with market shares convergence and profitability
divergence described above, it raises an important question: Why, when switching costs
suddenly decrease, does the leader not compete as aggressively as the other firms? This
empirical result is counter-intuitive, because at first one tends to think that the leader is the
firm most privileged by the absence of MNP, and therefore the firm most likely to respond
aggressively when MNP is introduced. To make sense of this puzzle, we hypothesize that
the effect of MNP differs across firms due to consumer heterogeneity. If different consumers
have different tastes, then on the eve of MNP each firm is catering to a different set of
consumers. Due to high switching costs, some of those consumers may have signed up
for service contracts at a time when the market structure differed, and now that MNP is
arriving they are planning to switch firms.
On the eve of MNP, we can categorize consumers into three groups, based on their
sensitivity to price changes after MNP is introduced.
• Inframarginal consumers will stay with their existing firm if prices change only marginally;
• Marginal consumers are close to indifference over whether to switch, and will be
sensitive to marginal price changes;
• Supramarginal consumers plan to switch firms at the current prices, and marginal
price changes will not affect their decision.
In a market inhabited by a dominant firm and some upstart entrants, the dominant firm
may have many supramarginal customers who signed up before the entrants were viable. In
order to retain these supramarginal customers, the firm would have to significantly decrease
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its prices. But a dominant firm probably also has many inframarginal customers, and a
large price decrease will significantly reduce the profitability of serving them. So the large
firm has to weigh the tradeoff between supramarginal and inframarginal customers. A small
upstart firm, however, probably has few inframarginal customers; meanwhile, it is going to
attract relatively many of the dominant firm’s supramarginal customers. Hence a small firm
mainly weighs the profitability of serving the supramarginal switchers against the benefit
of attracting additional marginal customers away from the dominant firm. Depending on
the composition of the firms’ customer bases on the eve of MNP, these decisions can lead
to the pricing behavior that we document.
Since we cannot observe consumer valuations, to understand the division of consumers
across firms we must look at the historical development of each market prior to MNP. For
instance, in a two-firm market with roughly equal customer bases on the eve of MNP, the
allocation of consumers to firms will be different across the following historical settings:
• If market saturation has been relatively constant and firm 1 was initially dominant
but has recently lost market share to upstart firm 2, we might expect firm 1 to
have many supramarginal customers waiting to switch, while firm 2 should have few
supramarginal customers to lose. Hence firm 2 may actually have more inframarginal
customers than firm 1.
• If market saturation has been increasing, and both firms have been growing quickly
with roughly equal market shares all along, we might expect that most consumers
signed up with whichever firm was better for them, so neither firm has very many
supramarginal customers, and both primarily serve inframarginal customers.
• If market saturation is still low, even if one firm was historically dominant, both firms
may have large numbers of marginal consumers who recently signed up, and relatively
few supramarginal or inframarginal customers. Furthermore, many consumers who
have never signed with either firm may be responsive to marginal price decreases.
These kinds of intuitions support a variety of exploratory hypotheses. We consider two
in particular:
1. The pricing response to MNP depends on the historical growth paths of the firms, in
addition to their sizes;
2. The pricing response to MNP of a given firm depends on the size of its largest com-
petitor.
We address these hypotheses using a global dataset covering the mobile phone service in-
dustries of 52 countries over the period 2003–2009. We find that firms that grew more
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rapidly in the 3–8 quarters prior to MNP respond to MNP more aggressively; such firms
probably have relatively few supramarginal customers to lose but may be able to attract
many additional marginal customers after MNP. We also find that firms facing large com-
petitors respond to MNP less aggressively. Combined with the observation that large firms
respond to MNP less aggressively, this finding suggests that a firm may expect to attract
many supramarginal customers away from a large competitor after MNP is implemented,
and that marginal customers may be relatively unimportant.
We consider the above findings suggestive and exploratory for now. To develop formal
testable implications, we construct a model of dynamic duopoly that incorporates both
network externalities and switching costs. Each consumer has an idiosyncratic valuation for
each firm’s product, and consumers are distributed uniformly on the two-dimensional unit
simplex. In addition, all consumers share a common concern for the size of their product’s
network. The game starts with an arbitrary inherited market structure, in which consumers
are already attached to particular firms (or the “null firm,” for unattached consumers) in a
manner consistent with some historical price path. Once a consumer has chosen a product
from one of the firms, he faces a cost of switching—either to the other firm or to exiting the
market; this switching cost is reduced when MNP arrives. Then firms can set new prices,
and consumers may switch.
First, we show how to compute the current market structure under duopoly for any
historical price path under switching costs. Given current prices, the current market can
always be characterized by the lowest-value consumer served by each firm, and the boundary
dividing the customers attached to each firm. In the two-dimensional space representing
consumer valuations for the two firms’ products, this boundary between the two firms’
customers is piecewise linear with slope either 0, 1, or∞ almost everywhere, and is contained
in a band of width twice the switching cost. These results characterize the entire class of
possible inherited market structures.
We find that a fully dynamic, multiperiod version of this model, with fully rational,
forward-looking firms and consumers, is analytically intractable even without switching
costs. We show where analytical tractability breaks down, and propose several conjectures
that could be studied numerically. However, since our main focus is on the effect of switch-
ing costs, we simplify the solution concept in order to focus on the most relevant issues.
Specifically, we assume that both firms and consumers act myopically. Consumers purchase
whichever product they find most advantageous at that moment, without considering future
switching costs that they might incur. Similarly, firms set prices to maximize their profits
in the current period, without accounting for the way the current period outcome may
lead to future changes. The main benefit of these assumptions is tractability; of course the
drawback is that dynamic strategic considerations are eliminated. In a sense, our solution
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concept can be viewed as a kind of steady state analysis, since in a steady state, myopic
beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path. Although myopic beliefs are typically wrong
regarding the dynamic consequences of deviating, since a myopic deviator believes that its
opponent will not respond to the deviation, deviations will tend to be more attractive under
myopic beliefs than under fully rational beliefs. Therefore a steady state equilibrium under
myopic beliefs will also tend to be a steady state equilibrium under fully rational beliefs.
(To be able to make such a claim formally, we will need to establish that the game satisfies
appropriate monotonicity properties; this is an issue for future research.)
This model has several distinguishing features. First, it has both network externalities
and switching costs. Network externalities and switching costs have been studied intensively
but separately in the literature (Farrell and Klemperer 2007). Surprisingly, little work has
been done to understand their interplay (except Doganoglu and Grzybowski 2005, Suley-
manova and Wey 2008 and Chen 2010). While the literature on switching costs usually does
not consider any network effects, the literature on network effects usually presumes infinite
switching costs that induce lock-in. In fact, customer switching is a salient feature that
distinguishes network industries from others (Shy 2001); the co-existence and interaction
between switching costs and network effects would have important implications for market
competition in these industries. By explicitly modeling finite switching costs with net-
work externalities, our model provides general insights, and is applicable to understanding
switching costs and network effects in various industries.
Second, our model contributes to the understanding of market dynamics and industry
evolution in the presence of network externalities and switching costs. The very few studies
on network externalities and switching costs rely on finite-period models, such as Doganoglu
and Grzybowski (2005) and Suleymanova and Wey (2008). These models inevitably involve
end-of-game effects in the last period, whereas we distill an infinite-horizon model down to a
steady-state question without endgame effects. One notable exception is Chen (2010), who
studies a dynamic oligopolistic model with symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. Finally,
previous works have generally assumed a one-dimensional type space where a consumer’s
preference for one firm is inversely related to her preference for the other firm. This means
that if the market is unsaturated, the firms have no strategic interaction. Therefore, most
of these studies assume the market is saturated. In contrast, our assumption of a two-
dimensional type space admits the possibility that the market is unsaturated, which accords
with empirical evidence.
We are still in the early stages of working with this model. Our steady state solution
concept is easy to work with numerically, and so far appears to be analytically tractable
as well. Testable implications will arise from relating market structure of the eve of MNP
to the historical price path, and from relating the inherited market structure to the pricing
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behavior that arises in equilibrium once MNP is instituted. We think that both the model
and the data sets are well suited to this purpose, and expect to make rapid progress over
the coming year.
In sum, we develop a unique model in that it incorporates both network externalities
and switching costs in growing markets under a dynamic oligopolistic setting. This fills an
important gap in the literature. Furthermore, with MNP as a valuable experiment in the
wireless industry, our empirical study provides useful insights into switching costs related
policymaking in network industries.
2 Model
In this section, we describe the model. We analyze a discrete time model of a duopolistic
industry with finite switching costs and network externalities. To simplify the analysis, we
assume all agents are myopic.
2.1 Consumers
We model consumers using a overlapping generations framework. Each consumer maximizes
his payoff over a two period horizon, which then repeats. There is a unit mass of consumers
evenly divided between “young” and “old” in each period, with age independent of prefer-
ences. In order to purchase from a firm, a consumer must sign a two-period contract when
young that obligates the consumer to purchase from that firm in both period of her life at
the same price in both periods. Consumers are not allowed to enter into a contract when
old.
Consumers have a maximum demand of one unit. Let j ∈ J = {A,B, 0} be each
consumer’s action set at any moment in time, where j = A or B corresponds to purchasing
from firm A or B, and j = 0 corresponds to the null firm, or not purchasing the good. A
consumer i is distinguished by her preference θi,j for firm j’s product, where θi = (θi,A, θi,B)
is distributed on Θ = {θ ∈ R20+ | θA + θB ≤ 1} with a pdf f(θ). For convenience, we refer to
θi,j as a j-type.
Consumers also have preferences over the number of other individuals sjt who purchase
the good from firm j at the same time, which is the market share or the size of the network.
This preference is proportional to the size of the network at rate φj < 1. Let the number
of consumers signing a new contract with firm j at time t be njt . Because consumers sign
two-period contracts, the size of firm j’s network at time t is sjt = n
j
t−1 + n
j
t .
Additionally, if at any time a consumer purchases the good from a different firm then
they did in the previous generation, they incur a switching cost of β. For simplicity, we
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assume that consumers’ preferences are additively separable in direct utility, the network
externality, the switching cost, and prices.
Because the fully dynamic problem with forward looking firms and consumers is in-
tractable, we limit the scope of consumers’ foresight. First, each consumer is myopic in
that she purchases from the firm that maximizes current surplus and does not consider
future switching costs. Second, recall that a consumer’s payoff from a firm depends on the
her expectations of that firm’s market share next period. We assume that each consumer
expects the same number of consumers to sign a contract this period and next period as did
last period; that is, E[njt+1] = E[n
j
t ] = n
j
t−1 for all t and j so that E[s
j
t+δs
j
t+1] = 2(1+δ)n
j
t−1.
A consumer with preference θi purchases from firm j ∈ J at time t if J(θi, t) = j. This
function is the solution to the following problem:
J(θi, t) ≡ arg max
j∈J
(1 + δ)[θi,j − pjt + 2φjnjt−1]− βh(j, J(θi, t− 2))
where h(j, J(θi, t− 2)) =
0 if j = J(θi, t− 2) or J(θi, t− 2) = 0 or t ≤ 21 otherwise
In the first two periods, the switching cost term disappears. Clearly, p0t = 0 for all times t,
φ0 = 0, and θi, 0 = 0 for each consumer i. For simplicity, we assume φA = φB = φ.
2.2 Evolution of Market Shares
We begin by presenting an example of how market shares can potentially evolve. This is
a complicated process because it depends not only on how many consumers have already
purchased from each firm and prices, but which consumers purchase from each firm. There
are two additional pieces of notation that play a critical role in determining which consumers
purchase from which firm. First, let ψjt be the lowest j-type who purchases from firm j at
time t. By definition, the only consumers who do not purchase from either firm are those
with sufficiently weak preferences (i.e. θj < ψjt for j = A,B). We need to characterize the
partition of consumers between firm A and firm B. Second, let θj be the j-type who receives
0 surplus when purchasing from firm j if she does not have to pay a switching cost. This
provides a simple cutoff for when consumers wish to purchase from a given firm. This will
be sufficient even when considering consumers who face a switching cost because payoffs
are additively separable in direct preferences and switching costs.
Consider the behavior of consumers who have previously not purchased the good. Ig-
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noring indifference, their purchasing strategy is:
J(θi, t|J(·, t− 2) = 0) =

A if θi,A ≥ θA and θi,B ≤ θi,A + [θB − θA]
B if θi,B ≥ θB and θi,B ≥ θi,A + [θB − θA]
0 if θi,A ≤ θA or θi,B ≤ θB
Now consider the behavior of consumers who have previously purchased from firm A. Their
purchasing decision is:
J(θi, t|J(·, t− 2) = A) =

A if θi,A ≥ θA − β and θi,B ≤ θi,A + [θB − (θA − β)]
B if θi,B ≥ θB and θi,B ≥ θi,A + [θB − (θA − β)]
0 if θi,A ≤ θA − β or θi,B ≤ θB
The behavior of consumers who have previously purchased from firm B is analogous, where
the switching cost appears with θB rather than θB.
No matter what previous decision a consumer has made, the set of types who are in-
different between firm A and firm B given this decision are on a line of slope 1. We call
the lines partitioning the consumer space conditional on having previously purchased from
firm j the j-threshold. Using these thresholds, we graphically show the distribution of a
generation of consumers between firms in Figure 1 starting at t = 1.
We begin by constructing the division of consumers who have not previously purchased
from any firm (1a), which leads to a distribution of consumers (1b). This demonstrates
one of the key features of this model; because direct preferences for the two firms are not
perfectly correlated, it is possible to have strategic interaction between the firms without
requiring a saturated market.
At t = 3, when these consumers again make a decision, there are three thresholds to
consider–one for each previous decision a consumer could have made. These thresholds are
constructed as detailed in the above equations (1c) and all have the shape. In turn, this
leads to a new distribution of consumers between firms (1d). For the illustrated values, no
consumers who previously purchased the good switch firms. No customers begin purchasing
from firm A, while Firm B attracts new consumers (consumers with θi,B ∈ [θB3 , ψB1 ] and
θi,A ≤ ψA1 begin purchasing from firm B).
This also shows the effect of switching costs on consumers. Some consumers purchasing
from firm A (those with θi,A ∈ [ψA1 , θA3 ]) are actually receiving negative surplus. These
consumers would prefer to exit the market if they did not have to pay the switching cost.
In addition, some consumers purchasing from firm A would prefer to purchase from firm B
instead of firm A. The threshold for consumers who did not purchase in the previous period
8
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Figure 1. Possible Distribution of Consumers with a Dominant Firm
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represents what consumers would do if they did not have to pay a switching cost. Also, note
that the partition of consumers between firm A and firm B is not a function; a consumer
with an A-type of ψA3 is indifferent between purchasing from the two firms if θ
B ∈ [θB3 , ψB1 ].
In order to capture the possibility of vertical segments, the partition must be represented
by a correspondence.
Repeating this process again at t = 5 yields new thresholds (1e) and yet another par-
tition of consumers between firms (1f). Again, no consumers who previously purchased
the good switch firms. However, both firms now attract new consumers. The partition of
consumers now contains a horizontal segment. As we continue to repeat this process, the
partitioning correspondence will be continuous, differentiable almost everywhere, and made
up of segments of slope 0, 1, or ∞. Therefore, given a nondecreasing correspondence1 we
can find a series of prices as t → ∞ such that the partition of consumers between firms
approximates the correspondence arbitrarily closely.
Let gt(·) : [ψA, 1]⇒ [ψB, 1] be a such a nondecreasing correspondence between A-types
and B-types. At any time t, the relevant information for determining the evolution of
the distribution of consumers between firms consists of (A) the number of old consumers
that have contracts with each firm, and (B) the distribution of currently young consumers
between firms at t− 2. As a shorthand, we will write ht = {ψAt−2, ψBt−2, gt−2(·);nAt−1, nBt−1}.
Then, we can partition the space of consumers as follows:
J(θ, t) ≡ J(θ|ht, pjt , p−jt )

A if θA ≥ ψAt and θB < inf gt(θA)
B if θB ≥ ψBt and θB > sup gt(θA)
0 if θA < ψAt and θ
B < ψBt
If θB ∈ g(θA), then a consumer with these preferences is indifferent between purchasing
from the two firms. The set of such consumers are of measure 0, so we ignore them. We
call gt(·) the partitioning function.
We can then write the number of consumers who sign with firm j at time t as
njt (p
j
t , p
−j
t , h
t) =
∫
Θ
1{J(θ|ht, pjt , p−jt )) = j}f(θ)d(θ)
2.3 Firms
As with consumers, we place limitations on the firms’ farsightedness. In particular, we
assume firms are myopic and only maximize their profit in the current period. In contrast
to consumers, however, firms correctly forecast the number of consumers who sign a contract
1That is, if x′ > x, then sup g(x) ≤ inf g(x′).
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in the current period.
In addition, firms incur a cost that depends on the number of consumers the firm must
serve in each period that potentially varies over time and between firms. Unless otherwise
noted, we will typically assume that firms have constant marginal costs that do not vary
over time and no fixed costs; that is, cjt (s) = c
js for all t with cj ≥ 0. If marginal costs
were decreasing (or increasing), firms would have economies (or diseconomies) of scale. This
would only accentuate (or counteract) the firms’ existing incentive to attract a larger market
share due to the network externality.
Therefore, after history ht, firm j solves the following problem:
max
pj
Πj(pj , p−j , ht) = pj · nj(pjt , p−jt , ht)− cjt
(
njt−1 + n
j(pjt , p
−j
t , h
t)
)
2.4 Solution Concept
Given the static nature of the model, the appropriate solution concept is a Nash equilibrium
in prices given any history. We look for steady states in equilibrium A steady state is a
history in which the market partition is the same in the prior two periods, and does not
change in equilibrium. In a sense, our solution concept can be viewed as a kind of dynamic
steady state analysis, since in a steady state, myopic beliefs are correct along the equilibrium
path. However, myopic beliefs are typically wrong regarding the dynamic consequences of
deviating, since a myopic deviator believes that neither he nor his opponent will respond
to the deviation.
Figure 2(a) illustrates a steady state equilibrium. At the current prices, no consumer
wishes to switch; the threshold for each firm’s existing consumers does not intersect the set
of consumers who are attached to that firm.
As a preview of later work on comparative statics with respect to switching costs, Fig-
ure 2(b) illustrates our classification of consumers after switching costs fall to 0 (as in
MNP). If prices remain the same, some consumers are inframarginal and will continue to
purchase from the firm they are already attached to, even if prices change marginally. Some
consumers are supramarginal and will switch firms, even if prices change marginally. As
drawn, some consumers are inframarginal between A & B; A & 0; and B & 0. Finally, some
consumers are marginal and will change their choice of firm if prices change marginally.
These consumers are not labeled in the figure, but are simply those types on the boundary
between the supramarginal and inframarginal regions.
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3 Theoretical Analysis
This is a highly nonlinear optimization problem. At this time, we have been unable to
fully analyze the proposed model from Section 2. We first present two benchmarks without
switching costs in Section 3.1 to highlight the difference between the dynamic steady state
and static equilibrium. Then, we examine two examples with positive but finite switching
costs and linear partition correspondences in Section 3.2 to illustrate the basic workings
of the model. Finally, we describe our plan for analyzing the model in full generality in
Section 3.3.
Because the partition correspondence is linear both in the benchmarks (because switch-
ing cost are 0) and examples (by assumption), we can simplify the problem by translating
it from a choice of prices to a choice of the θj ’s, the lowest j-type that is willing to purchase
from firm j without switching costs. Solving for prices in terms of consumer types yields
pjt = θ
j
t + 2φn
j
t−1.
3.1 Benchmarks
In this section, we compare the steady state of a dynamic model with forward looking firms
but myopic consumers with the steady state of the static model described in Section 2,
assuming there are no switching costs.
Note that without switching costs, the partition correspondence always has slope 1 and
θjt = ψ
j
t . We can then express the number of consumers who sign a contract with each
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firm solely as a function of the θj ’s because history only matters through the number of
consumers who signed a contract with each firm in the previous period. This is:
nj(θj , θ−j) =
12 [(θj − 1)2 − (θ−j − 1)2 + 1− 2θjθ−j ] if θj + θ−j ≥ 1(1− θj)2 if θj + θ−j ≥ 1
We then investigate the static model, maintaining the same assumptions. This allows
us to compare the first order condition that determines a steady state in the variant with
forward looking firms to the first order condition that solves the static model.
3.1.1 Dynamic Model without Switching Costs
In the dynamic model, firm j’s must choose a sequence of consumer types. His problem is:
max
{θjt}
Πjdyn[{θjt}, {θ−jt }] ≡
∞∑
t=1
δt(1 + δ)
[
(θjt + 2φn
j
t−1 − cj)njt
]
(1)
s.t. θjt ∈ [0, 1] ∀t
Because consumers sign a two period contract, firms collect revenues from these con-
sumers in two periods. With constant marginal costs, firms incur the same costs for serving
these consumers during both periods of their contract. Therefore, each generation’s profits
are weighted by 1 + δ. While this affects the level of profits, it does not affect the solution.
The general first order condition is:
∂Πjdyn
∂θjt
= njt +
(
θjt + 2φ[n
j
t−1 + δn
j
t+1]− cj
) ∂njt
∂θjt
≡ 0
In the steady state, when θjt = θ
j and njt = n
j for all t, this condition is:
nj +
(
θj + 2(1 + δ)φnj − cj) ∂nj
∂θj
≡ 0 (2)
3.1.2 Static Model without Switching Costs
In the static model, firm j must choose a single consumer type. He solves the following
problem:
max
θj
Πj(θj , θ−j , ht) ≡ (θjt + 2φnjt−1 − cj)nj (3)
s.t. θjt ∈ [0, 1] ∀t
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The first order condition is:
nj +
(
θj + 2φnjt−1 − cj
) ∂nj
∂θj
≡ 0
In a steady state, njt−1 = n
j
t = n
j , so the first order condition is
nj +
(
θj + 2φnj − cj) ∂nj
∂θj
≡ 0 (4)
Note that Eq. 2 and Eq. 4 are nearly identical; the only difference is an extra (1 + δ) term
multiplying the nj ∂n
j
∂θj
term in the former. In the dynamic model, firms consider the effect
of increasing their market share today on profits tomorrow. This appears as a more heavily
weighted network externality coefficient that depends on the firm’s patience. A similar
result holds for the second derivatives as well. Because the structure of the optimization
problem are therefore the same, the solution to Eq. 1 and Eq. 3 will share the same general
comparative statics with respect to φ and cj . In fact, if δ = 0, the solutions coincide.
Therefore, static model is a reasonable approximation of the dynamic model.
3.1.3 Comparative Statics without Switching Costs
Unfortunately, solving for an equilibrium analytically for all parameter values is intractable.
Solving the system of equations given by the first order conditions for the two firms in either
model requires finding the roots of a sixth degree polynomial. For now, we posit several
conjectures based on numerical investigation.
Conjecture 1. There is at most one equilibrium in which the firms have strategic interac-
tion (that is, θA + θB < 1).
Conjecture 2. If the rate of preference for the network externality φ increases, then both
firms reduce their price and see their market share and profits increase.
Conjecture 3. As marginal cost of one firm increases, then (a) that firm increases its
price, and its market share and profits decrease; and (b) the other firm reduces its price
while its market share and profits increase.
3.2 Examples with Switching Costs
To capture the intuition that the age of the firms matter, we consider two extreme situations.
We begin by examining the steady state when one firm is considerably older than the
other. We represent this with a vertical market partition correspondence. This represents
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a scenario where firm A is much older than firm B.2 Figure 3 presents a graphical depiction
of how this might happen. Suppose firm A is a monopolist. Then, the set of consumers who
buy from firm A are those whose A-type is larger than some cutoff value; that is, there is a
vertical partition correspondence between those who purchase from firm A and those who
do not. Now consider what happens when firm B enters the market. The first consumers
to switch from firm A to firm B are those with high B-types and low A-types. The market
partition correspondence will still be vertical except near the edge of the consumer space.
Then, we analyze the steady state when firms are of similar age. We proxy this by
a market correspondence that has a slope of 1. This captures the idea that no firm was
dominant during the early periods of the market, in contrast to the scenario described in
the previous paragraph.
3.2.1 Firms of Different Ages
Market shares will remain constant if θj − β ≤ ψj ≤ θj and θA − θB ≤ 1 + β − 2ψA. Firm
j would like to choose the highest price, or equivalently, the highest θj as long as these
constraints are satisfied. If ψA + ψB + β ≥ 1, then the first set of constraints binds and
firm j can choose θj = ψj + β. However, if ψA + ψB + β < 1 the second constraint binds
and there will be a set of potential steady state equilibria.
Our analysis of this example is still in progress.
3.2.2 Firms of Similar Ages
Note that market shares will stay constant if θj−β ≤ ψj ≤ θj . Therefore, the only possible
steady state equilibrium involves θj − β = ψj . Suppose to the contrary that both firms
1
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θB
Firm A
Firm B
No Firm
(a) Consumers with Monopoly
1
10
θA
θB
Firm A
Firm B
No Firm
A-Threshold
θA3 − β
0-Threshold
θA3
θB3
(b) Market Thresholds
1
10
θA
θB
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Firm B
No Firm
ψA3
ψB3
(c) Consumers with Duopoly
Figure 3. Possible Partition Correspondence with an Old Firm
2If firm B is much older than firm A, we use a horizontal market partition correspondence.
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are choosing the θj ’s so that market shares remain constant, but that one firm is setting
θj < ψj + β. But then an increase in θj is equivalent to increasing the price without affect
the market share. Given that costs are low enough to warrant production, this is a profitable
deviation.
Consider firm A’s choice. Given that the firm B is setting θB = ψB+β, there are several
types of deviations. Firm A could choose to attract new consumers at the cost of lowering
his price (or equivalently, θA < ψA). This requires a discrete drop in the price relative to the
steady state price. If he lowers his price slightly, he will attract only previously unattached
consumers, while if lowers his price dramatically, he will also attract consumers previously
attached to firm B.
Firm A could instead choose to raise his price (that is, setting θA > ψA + β) at the
cost of allowing some of his existing consumers to switch away from him. If he raises his
price only slightly, he will just lose consumers to the null firm. If he raises his price by a
moderate amount, he will lose consumers both to the null firm and to firm B, but there
will be consumers who are indifferent between staying with firm A and switching to firm B.
If he raises his price by a large amount, he will again lose consumers both to the null firm
and firm B, but now there will be no consumers indifferent between the two firms. This is
equivalent to being a monopolist over the highest A-types.
Firm A’s profit function (conditional on θB = ψB+β) is a piecewise continuous function
with six different segments. We need to find firm A’s best response on each region, and look
for the set of initial market shares (ψA, ψB) such that there is a steady state equilibrium.
Our work on analytically characterizing all possible steady states is still in progress for
a given set of parameters. Preliminary numerical investigation yields the following findings.
Our results are presented graphically in Figure 4, where the set of steady states (represented
as (ψA, ψB) ) for a given switching cost consists of all points within the corresponding line.
Start by considering the results with positive switching costs. Because the sets overlap,
we cannot offer predictions on exactly how the steady state will change as a result in the
decrease in switching costs. However, we can describe the movements in terms of a set
ordering. A decrease in switching costs from β = .3 to β = .2 and then β = .1 has two
effects. First, the steady states with the greatest degree of dispersion become less extreme.
This is seen by the compression toward the center of the consumer space. Second, consider
symmetric steady states. A symmetric steady state is more competitive than another if
prices, or equivalently, the lowest consumer types are lower in the first steady state than the
second. As switching costs fall, both the most competitive and least competitive symmetric
steady states become less competitive. This is represented by the shift to the northeast.
There seems to be something unique about the model when there are no switching
costs. First, the set of steady states when there are no switching costs has a radius of less
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than .0007, which is much smaller than the set of steady states associated with the other
switching costs. Second, either there is a discontinuity in the direction of movement of the
set of steady states as switching costs fall, or it reverses itself. We need to look at switching
costs between β = 0 and β = .1 to see which is the case.
We need to investigate this example further to (A) pinpoint the reasons behind the
movement of the set of steady states with positive switching costs, and (B) identify either
what causes the discontinuity in the effect of decreasing switching costs or why the direction
reverses for low switching costs.
We plan to derive the analytic conditions determining steady states to formally capture
the mechanisms behind these phenomena.
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Figure 4. Comparative Statics with Respect to Switching Costs with Firms of Similar Ages
3.3 Plan for General Analysis
After finishing our analysis of the extreme examples presented in Section 3.2, we plan to
generalize the above results to linear market partition correspondences with intermediate
slopes between 1 and∞. Again, our focus is on how a decrease in switching costs a la MNP
affects the set of steady state equilibria.
Using the slope of the market partition correspondence as a proxy for age (with steeper
slopes corresponding to an older firm A), we will be able to perform comparative statics on
the effects of decreasing switching costs with respect to the relative age of the firms.
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4 Empirical Evidence
To gauge the effect of switching costs on prices in the network industry, we use MNP policy
in the cellular phone service market as a natural empirical setting. We test two major
hypotheses: the effect of a decrease in switching costs induced by MNP depends on the
age and size of firms, and the detailed market structure. We consider these two factors
because in a market where firms other than the leader have arisen only recently, the leader
should have more supramarginal customers to lose. These customers subscribed to the
leader before alternative firms were available. Hence, the leader that has longer presence in
the industry should respond to MNP less aggressively.
4.1 Data
We use two primary datasets in the empirical analysis. The first is a firm-level quarterly
panel dataset from the Global Wireless Matrix, with 218 major wireless operators over 6
years (2003Q1-2009Q2) in 52 countries. During the sample period, 30 countries implemented
MNP policy. Variables used in this study include number of subscribers, market share of
subscribers, and monthly prices (based on average revenue per user).
In a cross-country study as ours, it is important to control for heterogeneity in in-
dustry characteristics and national demographics that may influence the relationships of
major interest. Hence, the firm-level dataset is complemented by the Global Market Infor-
mation Database with country-level variables. This includes cellular growth rate (Growth
Rate), the number of cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants (Cellular Penetration), substi-
tute/complementary services such as Fixed-line Telephone Penetration and Internet Pen-
etration, GDP per capita, as well as demographics variables including the percentages of
age groups 13-19 (Teen), 20-29 (Young), and 30-49 (Mid-age), and people with higher ed-
ucation (HiEdu) out of the total population. Summary statistics of variables are reported
in Table 1. A simple mean comparison (Columns 2 and 3) shows that the average market
share increases after MNP (also the market concentration index HHI), while average prices
decrease.
4.2 Analysis
Our empirical analysis is at an exploratory stage. As testable predictions of how switching
costs would affect equilibrium prices have not been generated from the new analytical
model, there is little guidance for the precise specification of the regression models. Hence,
our analysis and interpretation of results are primarily based on conjectures.
To explore the possibility that firms might adjust prices in anticipation of MNP, we
estimate prices as a function of lagged time trend. With a time trend of lagged 8 quarters
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1   Descriptive Statistics  
 Full Sample Before MNP After MNP Obs 
Firm-level Variables    
Market Share 0.261 0.263 0.258 4809 
 (0.171) (0.183) (0.154)  
Price  27.770 37.016 30.559 4161 
 (16.874) (13.645) (18.050)  
Country-level Variables    
Cellular Market    
HHI  0.359 0.379 0.334 5294 
 (0.099) (0.111) (0.074)  
Market Growth Rate 0.056 0.083 0.023 5082 
 (0.082) (0.093) (0.048)  
Cellular Penetration 0.737 0.534 0.999 5336 
 (0.376) (0.334) (0.239)  
Substitute/Complementary 
Markets 
   
Fixedline Penetration 0.325 0.209 0.481 5450 
 (0.204) (0.165) (0.136)  
Internet Penetration 0.178 0.094 0.281 5450 
 (0.141) (0.113) (0.097)  
Demographics    
GDP per capita($millions) 0.019 0.008 0.034 5450 
 (0.018) (0.001) (0.014)  
High Education  0.137 0.100 0.183 5225 
 (0.071) (0.063) (0.052)  
Teen 0.110 0.126 0.089 5450 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.016)  
Young  0.301 0.314 0.283 5450 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.023)  
Mid-age 0.135 0.124 0.149 5450 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.019)  
Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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and its quadratic term, we find that the lags are not significant until 2 quarters before MNP,
i.e., the coefficients on lagged 2 and 1 quarters are significantly negative (Column 1, Table
2). This may suggest that firms began to lower their prices 2 quarters before the policy
implementation. MNP was usually implemented much later than its announcement. For
example, in the U.S. MNP was postponed three times since its announcement in 1999 until
2003, due to strong resistance from large incumbents for fear of market share erosion. It is
plausible that firms may strategically respond to the policy during this time gap, especially
half a year before MNP, trying to sign up customers on longer contracts with lower prices,
so as to mitigate the policy impact.
To examine whether and how market share respond before MNP implementation, we
perform a similar analysis on market share. The regression estimation results (Column 2,
Table 2) show that market share does not adjust significantly before MNP. This may be
because many contracts are still in effect before MNP, hence customer base takes longer
time to adjust.
The results on prices appear as an “Ashenfelter’s Dip” (Ashenfelter 1978) before MNP,
i.e., it involves a decrease in prices shortly before the policy presumably due to the anticipa-
tion of its implementation. If such a transitory decrease in prices does exist, the impact of
MNP would have been overestimated if we do not consider this effect. Therefore, to account
for possible actions by wireless operators before the policy that might bias the results, we
exclude observations two quarters before MNP in the analysis hereafter.
Next, we investigate whether a firm’s historical growth path—a proxy for its age—and
its size would affect the MNP outcome. There are several steps involved: we estimate firms’
pricing trend between lagged 8 to lagged 3 quarters before MNP, predict prices after MNP
based on this trend, take the difference between actual prices and predicted prices, and
calculate the difference as “price deviation” from the trend after MNP.
Then we specify and estimate the following model. We regress price deviation on the
focal firm’s growth rate (percentage change in market share) between lagged 8 to lagged 3
quarters before MNP, its size (market share) before MNP, and the size of the largest firm
other than the focal firm before MNP:
pikt = α1 +
5∑
τ=1
βτ∆σik(t−τ−2) + β6σikt + β7σ(−i)kt + φZkt + γt + ηi + uk + εikt, ((1))
where pikt is the price deviation from the trend for firm i in country k at time t, ∆σik(t−τ)
is the market share growth rate of firm i in lagged τ quarter, σikt is the market share
of firm i, and σ(−i)kt = max
j 6=i
σjkt is the market share of firm i’s largest competitor; Zkt
includes the country-level variables, and γt has quarterly time dummies, seasonality and
country-specific time trend; ηi and uk capture unobservable firm and country fixed effects,
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Table 2. Time Trends before MNPTable 2: Time Trends before NP 
Dependent Variable Prices Market Share 
Lag 1 quarter -3.168** -0.000 
 (1.486) (0.009) 
Lag 2 quarter -2.919** -0.004 
 (1.429) (0.007) 
Lag 3 quarter -1.988 -0.007 
 (1.244) (0.009) 
Lag 4 quarter 0.243 -0.002 
 (0.858) (0.008) 
Lag 5 quarter 2.116 -0.004 
 (1.314) (0.010) 
Lag 6 quarter 0.201 -0.003 
 (1.226) (0.008) 
Lag 7 quarter 2.199 -0.001 
 (1.566) (0.009) 
Lag 8 quarter 2.130* -0.001 
 (1.255) (0.004) 
   
Observations 2284 2509 
R-squared 0.615 0.525 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
All regressions include quadratic time trend, seasonality, country-specific time trend, country and firm fixed effects 
and a constant term. These coefficients are not reported here.  
Other coefficients not reported: GDP per capita, Fixed-line Penetration, Internet Penetration, Teen, Young and 
Mid-age.  

*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel-
co rected tandard er ors ar in par ntheses. All regr ssions include quadratic time tr nd,
seasonality, country-specific time trend, country and firm fixed effects, and a constant term.
These coefficients are not reported here. Other coefficients not reported: GDP per capita,
Fixed-line Penetration, Internet Penetration, Teen, Young and Mid-age.
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respectively; εikt is the error term not captured by the regressors, which has zero conditional
mean E[εikt|∆σikt, σikt, Zkt, γt, ηi, uk, γt] = 0, under the assumption that it is uncorrelated
with the exogenous regressors in each period after controlling for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity. The parameters of primary interest are β′s, which measure how price devia-
tion depends on a firm’s previous growth pattern, its size, and its largest competitor’s size
before MNP.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. First, as can be seen from Column 1,
the growth rate of market share is significantly negative in lagged 3 quarters. It means that
the faster a firm grows prior to MNP, the greater its price deviates below the trend after
the policy. Specifically, a 1% increase in market share growth rate is associated with $6.834
decrease (or 20% decrease) in price after MNP. Second, firm size before MNP is positively
associated with the price deviation after MNP. That is, larger firms tend to price above
the trend after the policy. Together, these two results provide evidence that the historical
growth path and the size of a firm play important roles in the MNP effect. Whereas faster-
growing and smaller firms respond to the policy more aggressively to attract customers,
larger incumbents and firms growing more slowly tend to price less aggressively.
Third, the size of a focal firm’s largest competitor is negatively associated with the focal
firm’s price. A 1% increase in market share of its largest competitor is associated with
$1.571 decrease (or 5% decrease) in its price after MNP. The intuition is that prices are
strategic complements; if its largest competitor is a strong player with great network size,
the firm will be more likely to avoid intense undercutting.
For a robustness check, we use the percentage change in lagged subscriber penetration
(subscriber penetration is defined as the total number of a firm’s subscribers relative to the
national population), and the percentage change in lagged number of subscribers as regres-
sors in (1), respectively. The firm size and the size of its largest competitor are measured
by corresponding counterparts, i.e., subscriber penetration or number of subscribers. In
both regressions, the coefficients on a firm’s lagged growth rate and on the size of its largest
competitor are have the same negative direction as before (Columns 2 and 3, Table 4).
For another set of robustness, we use the level changes in lagged market share / lagged
subscriber penetration / lagged number of subscribers. Again, the evidence is consistent
with the previous findings (Table 4).
To summarize, there are two major findings in the present analysis: (1) The historical
growth pattern and the size of firms make a difference in MNP outcome; and (2) the size of
the focal firm’s largest competitor, which represents the detailed market structure, affects
its price responsiveness to MNP negatively. Once the comparative statics on switching costs
in the analytical model are derived, we will provide further analysis and more evidence for
these effects.
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Table 3. Price Deviation from TrendTable 3: Price Deviation fro  Trend 
 
 % Change in  
Market Share 
% Change in  
Firm Penetration 
% Change in  
Number of Subscribers 
Lagged 3 quarter -6.834*** -3.544** -2.608 
 (2.552) (1.656) (1.671) 
Lagged 4 quarter 9.505 3.317 -3.202 
 (6.627) (5.001) (3.614) 
Lagged 5 quarter 7.627 7.533 5.213 
 (5.462) (5.940) (6.699) 
Lagged 6 quarter 3.688 6.090*** 2.873 
 (2.477) (1.633) (2.006) 
Lagged 7 quarter 0.565 3.382 0.370 
 (1.709) (2.257) (1.616) 
Firm Size 13.142** -5.270 0.179 
 (7.057) (3.372) (0.128) 
Size of Largest Competitor -1.571** -3.554** -0.343 
 (0.706) (1.460) (0.224) 
    
Observations 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.398 0.347 0.364 
 
Dependent variable in all regressions is price deviation from the time trend.  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
All regressions include quarterly dummy, seasonality, country-specific time trend, country and firm fixed effects and 
a constant term. These coefficients are not reported here.  
Other coefficients not reported: GDP per capita, Fixed-line Penetration, Internet Penetration, Teen, Young and 
Mid-age. 
Depen ent variable in ll regressions is price eviation from time trend. *, ** and *** de-
note statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel-corrected standard
errors are in parentheses. All regressions include quarterly dummy, seasonality, country-
specific tim rend, c untry and firm fixed ffects, and a constan t rm. Thes coefficients
are not reported here. Other coefficients not reported: GDP per capita, Fixed-line Pene-
tration, Internet Penetration, Teen, Young and Mid-age.
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Table 4. Robustnessle 4: Robustness 
 
 Change in  
Market Share 
Change in  
Firm Penetration 
Change in  
Number of Subscribers 
Lagged 3 quarter -16.921* -47.737*** -0.588** 
 (8.588) (17.800) (0.295) 
Lagged 4 quarter 16.670 -21.349 -0.208 
 (21.416) (16.275) (0.284) 
Lagged 5 quarter 12.612 30.011* 0.516* 
 (17.514) (16.165) (0.264) 
Lagged 6 quarter 17.767 37.128 0.209 
 (19.030) (24.184) (0.271) 
Lagged 7 quarter -3.882 -2.125 -0.083 
 (14.073) (29.787) (0.240) 
Firm Size 13.406 -45.825* -0.385 
 (26.461) (25.294) (0.379) 
Size of Largest Competitor -32.500*** -30.058*** -1.054*** 
 (11.881) (8.498) (0.256) 
    
Observations 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.340 0.326 0.315 
 
Dependent variable in all regressions is price deviation from the time trend.  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
All regressions include quarterly dummy, seasonality, country-specific time trend, country and firm fixed effects and 
a constant term. These coefficients are not reported here.  
Other coefficients not reported: GDP per capita, Fixed-line Penetration, Internet Penetration, Teen, Young and 
Mid-age.  
 

Dependent variable in all regressions is price deviation from time trend. *, ** and *** de-
note statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel-corrected standard
errors are in parentheses. All regressions include quarterly dummy, seasonality, country-
specific time trend, country and firm fixed effects, and a constant term. These coefficients
are not reported here. Other coefficients not reported: GDP per capita, Fixed-line Pene-
tration, Internet Penetration, Teen, Young and Mid-age.
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